The Battle of Dakar - 1940 - A House Divided

In September 1939, the United Kingdom and France went to war side by side against the German Reich. Just 12 months later, these erstwhile allies, who’s officers and men had fought, bled, and died together, were taking aim at each other. 

In the post WW1 environment, nobody wanted to repeat the same mistakes. And so, with the ink barely dry on the Treaty of Versailles, demilitarisation and disarmament agreements were being drawn up - such as the Washington Naval Treaty and the London Naval Treaty. 

All of this meant that by the 1930’s, the Royal Navy was at its smallest in decades resulting in the navy being forced to change its policy and become reliant on allies to gain naval superiority, in the event of war. This became even more imperative as Italy joined the war on Germany’s side, meaning that the allies’ position in the Mediterranean and North Africa was no longer secure. 

Despite the heroic effort of men on the ground in France, by mid-June 1940 President Renault of France knew that he would have to ask the Germans for an Armistice. The British Government understood the France situation and that their army was no longer capable of putting up an effective defense. 

The French Navy, however, was a different story. 

Marine National units at anchor, Mers El Kebir, 1940

Most of their fleet had managed to raise steam and escape the onslaught of the German Army and made for ports in France’s African colonies. Britain was keen to learn what would become of the French fleet once the Armistice was signed. 

The new French “Vichy” Government negotiated the terms of the armistice as best they could, and surprisingly, the treaty was quite lenient on the French fleet. Its ships were to be retained in French-owned ports and disarmed under German supervision and pledged not to claim the rest of the fleet for their own use. 

The unofficial flag of Vichy France

However, given Hitlers track record with promises, the British Government were skeptical of how faithful the Germans would be. British Command knew that should the Germans attempt to capture the Marine National’s remaining assets, there would be little chance of them failing. This could not be allowed to happen as it would give the Axis powers naval parity with the Royal Navy. 

The British Admiralty gave the French fleet an ultimatum, with 3 choices. 1) Sail to a British port and join the fight against Germany. 2) Sail to a British port and be interned for the rest of the war. After the war, the ships would be returned to France, or compensation paid. 3) Sail to a French port in the West Indies or the United States and remain out of the fight. 

At the port of Dakar in French West Africa, modern day Senegal, units of the French fleet centered themselves around the powerful modern battleship “Richelieu”. Unfortunately, the local government in French West Africa was loyal to the Vichy puppet government and rejected the ultimatum.

Richelieu underway, August 1943

The Free French forces based in Britain under General Charles De Gaulle, saw an opportunity to cement themselves as a legitimate factor in the war by reclaiming French colonies in Africa and using them as a springboard to the ultimate goal of retaking their homeland. 

Dakar was so desired by the Free French due to its important strategic location on Africa’s western most point, it would give them access to the shortest transatlantic route possible. On top of this, it had a large amount of vital infrastructure needed to support Free French operations including an international airport, large naval base, and coastal defenses. 

In the Summer of 1940, De Gaulle put forward plans for the retaking of Dakar involving a Royal Navy blockade of the port. Winston Churchill offered an altered version of the plan as he feared that a failed attempt to take the port would reflect badly on the U.K. in the eyes of the international community, particularly the U.S., and might have even forced Vichy France into the war on the Germans side. 

Churchill’s plan retained the Royal Navy element, only now an envoy would be sent into Dakar and attempt to reach a diplomatic solution, with the alternative being to face the overwhelming odds of the ships waiting out at sea. 

De Gaulle agreed, and with that “Operation Menace” was ready to be carried out September 8th, 1940.

General De Gaulle, 1942

However, problems arose almost instantly as the allies had little practical experience with amphibious assaults this early in the war and the plan changed on a daily basis causing numerous delays which was compounded by troop ships that were both too slow and too small, requiring lengthy replenishments. 

Furthermore, two British liaison officers who had been expelled from Dakar after the fall of France returned to the UK with the firm belief that French West Africa wasn’t as pro Free French as they had been led to believe, and that any landing attempted by the allies would in fact be opposed. 

Nevertheless, all the allied commanders on the ground, both British and French, supported the plan and were happy for the operation to proceed. This would be their undoing. 

On the morning of September, the 23rd Force M; the British contribution to Operation Menace headed by Admiral Cunningham, arrived outside Dakar in the planned “diplomatic” show of force and Ark Royal began launching her aircraft, not loaded with the usual assortment of bombs and torpedoes, but instead propaganda leaflets to drop on the inhabitants below. 

Ark Royal conducts flying ops, 1939

General De Gaulle made a radio address to the people of Dakar in an attempt to galvanise the local populous to the Free French cause. But all this served to do was warn the Vichy forces that something was coming, and their defenses were stood up. 

The French ships in port raised steam to break their way out of the port but they were persuaded back by warning shots from HMAS Australia, which were quickly met by fire from coastal batteries at 11:00am. 

Dakar from above, likely pictured in late 1930's

The British vessels occasionally fired back, but this was sporadic, as they sought to use as little force possible against their former allies. This engagement strategy severely hampered the British and allowed Vichy forces to get the upper hand despite the British being the superior force on paper; HMS Cumberland took a direct hit to her engine room and was forced out of the fight while the battleship HMS Barham was hit by two 15-inch shells from the modern French capital ship, Richelieu. 

With fog becoming a significant roadblock to British efforts to effectively defend themselves from the Vichy shore guns and De Gaulle’s radio messages falling on deaf ears. Force M fell back, having achieved nothing. Not long after, the Free French initiative to land troops on the beaches east of Dakar, was likewise foiled and they were forced to retreat. 

The Battle of Dakar had been an unmitigated disaster for the allies bred in large part by their underestimation of the resolve of the local Vichy forces, which gave them no option but to abandon the operation, with the only other alternative being to bombard the town, an act that would win the Free French no friends. 

All of this meant that De Gaulle was denied the prize of Dakar and damaged his reputation among allied commanders given that was his confidence in the plan. The General would have to settle for the less strategically and economically important territory of French Equatorial Africa to base his operations out of moving forward. 

This was also a major political blow for the British as it had been made clear that Dakar chose Vichy over Free France and now the world knew it. All this came at a time when the ability of Britain to stand alone in the face of the Nazi peril was under question; when Churchill was desperate to prove to the “new world” that he, and more importantly, the nation was prepared to stand in the gap.